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Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the firm-level relationship between the local input 
share and the number of used FTAs by employing the data on FTA utilization in Japanese affiliates 
in ASEAN. As a result, we do not find a robust linear relationship. However, affiliates using a large 
number of FTAs (seven or eight) have an extremely higher share of local inputs. This result might be 
interpreted as the first evidence of the “spaghetti bowl phenomenon”. 
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Highlights 
n It is examined as to whether users of multiple FTAs have a higher local input share. 
n We employ the firm-level data on FTA utilization in Japanese affiliates in ASEAN.  
n We find that users of seven/eight FTAs have a 20%-30% higher share of local inputs. 
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1. Introduction 
     The surge of free trade agreements (FTAs) in each country has publicly yielded 
concerns on firms’ inactive use of FTAs. According to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) website, as of January 2012, around 500 regional trade agreements have been 
notified to the WTO. In order to use FTA schemes, firms need to meet the rules of origin 
(ROOs). To do that, the users may need to change their procurement sources from the 
optimal pattern of procurement. In particular, for the use of multiple FTA schemes, 
firms may raise the share of local inputs in total inputs because local inputs can always 
meet ROOs in any kinds of FTAs. If so, though the net benefits from such multiple-FTA 
use must be positive, some amount of benefits will be offset by the change of 
procurement sources from the optimal pattern of procurement. We may say that this 
offset is one form of the “spaghetti bowl phenomenon”.1 
     This paper empirically investigates whether the use of multiple FTAs forces firms 
to raise their local input share in total inputs. To do that, we employ the unique dataset, 
which has been collected by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in 2011 
and 2012. In that survey, the very detailed firm-level information on FTA use is 
available according to FTA partner countries, in addition to some basic information on 
firms’ activities such as employment, the breakdown of their export destinations, and 
their procurement sources. In the academic literature on FTAs, there are few studies on 
firm-level FTA utilization. Demidova and Krishna (2008) is the theoretical study which 
demonstrates that only the productive firms can use FTA schemes in exporting. To our 
best knowledge, Takahashi and Urata (2010) is the only empirical study at the firm level. 
They examine FTA usage by Japanese firms at the firm level by employing a 
questionnaire survey, finding that larger firms are more likely to use FTA schemes. 
Against this literature on firm-level FTA utilization, our paper is the first one that 
examines the firm-level use of multiple-FTAs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section explains our data 
structure and presents an overview on firms’ use of multiple FTAs. After providing the 
results of econometric analysis in Section 3, we discuss the relationship of firms’ 
multiple-FTA use with their local input share in Section 4. 
 
 
2. Data Issues 
     As mentioned in the introductory section, our main data source is JETRO’s 
“Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN” for 2010 and 2011. For example, in 
                                                 
1 As for the more precise concept of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon, see Bhagwati et al. (1998). 
 3 
 
the survey for 2010, the questionnaires were sent to 4,164 Japanese affiliates operating 
in seven ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Vietnam, and Myanmar), receiving 1,865 valid responses. Of those, 1,111 were from 
Japanese affiliates in the manufacturing industry. Our use of foreign plants’ data enables 
us to avoid including firms not using FTA schemes because of their lack of knowledge 
on what FTAs are. Firms that invest abroad will have enough knowledge on FTAs 
because such companies are familiar with international activities and are also sensitive 
to the available tools in those activities. In short, foreign plants are more likely to 
behave rationally in their decisions on FTA use. 
Our focus on affiliates in ASEAN countries enables us to control for 
heterogeneity in rules of FTAs (e.g. ROOs) to some extent because ASEAN countries 
try to harmonize their respective FTAs among ASEAN members. In addition to the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), as of our sample period, ASEAN countries have 
bilateral or multilateral FTAs with Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New 
Zealand. Also, while Malaysia concludes its FTA with Pakistan, Singapore does so on 
its FTAs with Chile, Peru, and the United States. As a result, according to countries in 
which affiliates locate, the number of their potentially available FTAs is different. The 
sample affiliates for our analysis are restricted only to those in the manufacturing 
industry.2 
Next, we make an overview of affiliates’ use of FTAs. Figure 1 depicts the 
number of affiliates according to the number of FTAs that they use, indicating that 
nearly 70% of sample affiliates are non-users of FTAs. Table 1 reports the relationship 
between the average employment and the number of FTAs that an affiliate uses. In the 
“All” column, we cannot find its clear relationship. Such an unclear relationship can be 
seen even when taking a look at the relationship by country. Table 2 reports the 
relationship between the average share of local inputs and the number of FTAs that an 
affiliate uses. In the “All” column, affiliates using more than five FTA schemes seem to 
have a relatively high share of local inputs. We may find a relatively clear positive 
relationship in Singapore. 
 
===   Figure 1 & Tables 1-2   === 
 
                                                 
2 The industry classification in this dataset is rough; food industry, textile industry, wearing apparel, 
wooden products, furniture, paper industry, chemical industry, plastic products, medicine, rubber 
products, pottery, iron and steel, non-metallic mineral products, metal products, general machinery 
industry, electric machinery industry, transport equipment, precision machinery industry, and other 
manufacturing sectors. 
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3. Econometric Results 
This section reports our econometric results on the relationship between firms’ 
local input share and the number of FTAs that they use. The results of ordinary least 
square (OLS) estimation are provided in Table 3. We also introduce logs of affiliate 
employment and age into the equation to be estimated, in addition to industry dummy 
and country-year dummy. These two kinds of dummy variables will control for the 
difference in difficulty to meet the ROOs across industries and the difference in the 
number of potentially available FTAs among countries, respectively. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
From this OLS result, as is consistent with our expectation, we can see that the 
number of FTAs has a significant association with the local input share. Also, affiliate 
age has a significant coefficient: The older affiliates are more likely to have a higher 
share of local inputs perhaps because of their greater knowledge on local suppliers. The 
firm size in terms of employment does not significantly affect the local input share.3 
Next, we apply the instrument variable method to our model in order to take care of the 
simultaneity problem between local input share and the number of used FTAs. We use 
the number of destinations to which affiliates export as an instrument, which seems to 
be related to the number of used FTAs but not at least directly to the local input share. 
The results are reported in Table 3. The coefficient for the number of used FTAs turns 
out to be insignificant. The other interesting finding is that both the affiliate size and the 
number of export destinations are positively associated with the number of used FTAs. 
In the above analyses, we did not find a robust linear relationship between the 
local input share and the number of FTAs. Finally, in order to investigate its non-linear 
relationship, we introduce dummy variables according to the number of used FTAs 
instead of its continuous variable. The results are reported in Table 4, indicating that 
affiliates using more than six FTA schemes have a 20%-30% higher share of local 
inputs than do non-users of FTA schemes and the other affiliates, except for affiliates 
using three FTA schemes. The results on the other variables (i.e. employment and age) 
are not changed qualitatively. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
                                                 
3 We also estimate this model by the fractional logit technique, but the results are qualitatively 
unchanged. For the easier interpretation on marginal effect, we report only OLS results. 
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4. Discussion 
     Our findings for the analysis of Japanese affiliates in ASEAN are that there is no 
robust linear relationship between the local input share and the number of FTAs, but 
that affiliates using an extremely large number of FTAs in our sample have a high share 
of local inputs. In sum, when firms use so many FTA schemes at the same time, they 
may need to raise their local input share so as to meet ROOs in all FTA schemes. In this 
sense, some amount of benefits from the use of multiple FTAs is offset by the change of 
procurement sources from the optimal pattern of procurement. 
Against this, there are two noteworthy points. First, we need to investigate our 
hypothesis with a larger number of sample firms. As confirmed in Figure 1, the number 
of affiliates using seven or eight FTA schemes is less than 1% of our sample affiliates. 
Second, this weak evidence on the rise of local input share might be specific to FTAs 
concluded by ASEAN countries. As pointed out in Cadot and de Melo (2007), ROOs in 
their FTAs are much less restrictive than those in other FTAs existing in the world. Thus, 
it is important to investigate the same kind of hypothesis for the other regions, including 
America.  
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Table 1. Average Employment according to Number of Used FTAs 
Number of IDN KHM LAO MMR MYS PHL SGP THA VNM All
Used FTAs
0 966 128 60 439 393 899 265 599 752 615
1 1,406 350 440 875 457 1,322 187 413 471 597
2 1,268 601 600 429 1,019 214 759 691 742
3 688 610 584 71 1,394 674 917
4 360 405 259 2,738 1,625 1,553
5 364 719 141 1,812 515 994
6 4,135 264 550 1,492
7 1,274 113 3,102 998
8 89 95 93  
Source: Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania (JETRO) 
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Table 2. Average Share of Local Inputs according to Number of Used FTAs (%) 
Number of IDN KHM LAO MMR MYS PHL SGP THA VNM All
Used FTAs
0 0.41 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.42 0.29 0.23 0.54 0.27 0.44
1 0.38 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.22 0.31 0.56 0.28 0.45
2 0.44 0.01 1.00 0.43 0.21 0.26 0.52 0.20 0.44
3 0.64 0.48 0.22 0.53 0.58 0.23 0.49
4 0.35 0.40 0.42 0.51 0.07 0.42
5 0.90 0.31 0.76 0.47 0.08 0.44
6 0.68 0.63 0.57 0.62
7 0.51 0.75 0.50 0.63
8 0.37 0.82 0.64  
Source: Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania (JETRO) 
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Table 3. Baseline Estimation 
Estimation Method OLS
Dependent Variable Local Input Share Number of FTAs Local Input Share
Number of FTAs 0.011* 0.031
[0.006] [0.024]
ln Employment 0.0003 0.117*** -0.003
[0.006] [0.020] [0.007]
ln Age 0.032*** 0.049 0.032***
[0.012] [0.040] [0.012]
Number of Export Destination 0.183***
[0.021]
Industry Dummy YES YES YES
Country * Year Dummy YES YES YES
Observations 2,090 2,090 2,090
R-squared 0.1913 0.1830 0.1868
Insrument Variable Method
 
Notes: The parentheses are robust standard errors. *** and ** show 1% and 5% significance, 
respectively. 
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Table 4. OLS Estimation according to Number of FTAs 
Coef. R.S.E.
Number of FTAs
= 1 -0.020 [0.017]
= 2 -0.038 [0.024]
= 3 0.059** [0.030]
= 4 -0.016 [0.045]
= 5 0.058 [0.075]
= 6 0.167 [0.125]
= 7 0.200* [0.110]
= 8 0.314** [0.159]
ln Employment -0.0002 [0.006]
ln Age 0.036*** [0.012]
Dummy Variables
Industry YES
Country * Year YES
Observations 2,090
R-squared 0.1968  
Notes: The dependent variable is a share of local inputs in total inputs. R.S.E. indicates robust 
standard errors. *** and ** show 1% and 5% significance, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Number of Sample Affiliates according to the Number of FTAs 
 
Source: Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania (JETRO) 
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